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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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c The Eastern provinces of Poland are beyond saving. The Soviets
are already in occupation and the British and Americans will not fight
over the question of their restoration to Poland. Therefore., we must
rescue what we can of our country.
s Russia is greatly devastated and is not in a position to rebuild herself
without asking for the industrial help of the United States and Eiitain.
She will undoubtedly have to pay for this help by political concessions in
Europe and Asia, and therein lies the margin whereby., if not the sove-
reignty and freedom of Poland can be saved3 at least, the biological ex-
termination of the Polish people by the'Soviets might be delayed. In the
meantime., this action was progressing so rapidly^ by the killing and de-
portations^ that it is vital to give way to Moscow's demands in order that
the Polish race gain some respite. By renouncing the Eastern half of
Poland., it will still be possible to receive a guarantee from the Allies
regarding the Western remnant of the State.'
To this future Poland, Britain was willing to give a guarantee it is true,
but only a guarantee equal to that offered by Russia^ and as the latter had
in mind a4 free 5 Poland in the Soviet meaning of this word, then similarly,
Britain's guarantee in this case could mean just nothing—for nought plus
nought will always equal nought. . .
Roosevelt explained America's position clearly, by stating (in the letter
handed by the United States' Ambassador in Moscow, Averill Harriman,
to the Polish Prime Minister on November 23) that the administration of
the United States was constitutionally unable and traditionally unwilling
to guarantee any particular country or frontier. It was ready, however,
to try for the last time to persuade Marshal Stalin that the area of Lwow
and Drohobycz (the oil area) should be left to Poland. As to the Polish-
German frontier, it would not oppose any arrangement which Poland and
th@ U.S.S.R. and Great Britain might be able to reach in this respect.
Already a fortnight previously, Roosevelt had spoken with the repre-
sentatives of the Congress of American Poles, who had declared that
Poland could not agree to the Stalin-Churchill plan of recompensing this
country for the loss of her Eastern territories, " for it would be like
Canada taking the states of New England, including New York, and
wanting to give in return to the United States, Maryland." They asked
the President whether he was ready to " demand and defend the independ-
ence and territorial integrity of Poland,3' and to give a straightforward
answer.* In the Statement issued by the White House on October 12, the
* It was still unknown at this juncture whether Roosevelt had undertaken
any obligations towards Russia regarding Poland. Dewey, the rival candidate
for the Presidency, had said in his speech on October 18th, 1944, that Roosevelt
"undertook to handle this matter (Poland) personally and secretly with Mr
Stalin (in Teheran)." "At their only meeting/* Dewey continued, "neither
our Secretary of State, nor the Under-Secretary was present. Instead Mr,
Roosevelt took along Mr. Harry Hopkins,, who acquired bis training in foreign
a&aks running the W.P,A."
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